WHYTE'S THE ECLECTIC COLLECTOR SATURDAY & SUNDAY 25 & 26 July 2020

22 History work half this day translating’ orders and instructions for a Col. Tate, an American officer’ (Writings II, 397). The next day, Tone wrote that he had ‘made a fair copy of Colonel Tate’s instructions, with some alterations from the rough draft of yesterday...’ (Writings II, 399.) These ‘Secret instructions’ appear to be only a fragment, or a rough draft. Tone wrote that in the first draft Tate’s object was Liverpool, but this was changed to Bristol, which he was to ‘burn to the ground.’ (ibid). Tone was appalled at the role he was playing as Hoche’s adjutant general, and at the consequences of the orders he had ‘transcribed’ on civilians: thousands ‘and thousands of families reduced to beggary’. But the British had burned ‘without mercy in America’, and ‘such a thing’ was war. Uncharacteristically for Tone, his English in this document is often clumsy, and the transfer of certain phrases from French too literal. This is common in novice translators, but in this case makes it possible to ‘back-translate’ the text into French; this reveals some phraseology typical of the period and this type of text. Clearly his knowledge of French was far more operational than he had claimed during the first weeks after his arrival in France in February that same year. Tate, then aged sixty-nine, was an American military adventurer who had offered his services to the Directory. Hoche appointed him to lead, as Tone put it ‘a buccaneering party into England’. Initially this guerilla-style operation was intended to divert attention from the far more substantial French expedition making its way to Ireland, creating panic and occupying troops in England. French decision-makers, Hoche included, also had an underlying motive: avenging the British-backed landing of French royalist troops at Quiberon in June, 1795, hence the irregular tactics Tate was to use. But after the failure of the expedition to Bantry Bay in December 1796, surprisingly Tate was still ordered to proceed. His raid on Fishguard, 22 February, 1797 was a brief and pathetic affair which later embarrassed French military historians. Tate surrendered after two days, and the episode is remembered as ‘the Last invasion of England.’ However his written orders were found on his person and published by the authorities, to expose to the English people the true intentions of the French. There are a few similar turns of phrase between this much lengthier public version, promoting subversive warfare, and these instructions, probably Tone’s first rough draft. On Tate’s person was also found a letter Tone had written to him after the failure of the Bantry expedition, offering his services if the ‘affair’ was still to go ahead. After Tone’s arrest, Whitehall sent this letter to Dublin Castle to confirm the handwriting, as material to be produced at his trial. Tone had been imprudent in the extreme to have kept these ‘Secret instructions’. (ii) Carnot, in charge of military affairs within the five-man Directory, and here displaying the Anglophobia he shared with Hoche, had received Tone for bilateral discussions about an Irish invasion as early as February 1796. A florid introduction makes metaphorical references to the ancient world, typical of the period: ‘Shall Rome bow her lofty head beneath the yoke of the Carthaginians...?’ Carnot then presents a ‘Summary of two plans of attack upon England & Ireland & the means of uniting them.’ He argues that Ireland should be the objective; due to her position on the Atlantic, ‘the character’ of her inhabitants, and her weak defences, Ireland was ‘more exposed to an invasion than any other part of the British possessions in Europe.’There, the French force could reach the same ends, without exposing themselves to the same dangers as they would in Britain. The plan ‘supposes’ that Spain would unite with France in an assault to ‘destroy the power of England’, and that Spanish troops would also land in Ireland; this did not transpire in 1796. Two diversions would target England. Extremely rare. Written records trace the decision by the French government to launch what would be known as the Bantry Bay expedition to Ireland, under Hoche’s command, back to June 1796. This plan, dated 1 November, 1796, is not mentioned in Tone’s otherwise informative and revealing diary. Clearly it gave the final assent to the naval expedition he sailed on in December. Though it ends ‘the present decree is not to be published’, the document states that only two copies were to be made, one for the relevant records office, the other for the Ministers of War [Claude Pétiet] and Marine [Laurent Jean François Truguet] who were henceforth in charge of implementing the invasion plan. There were thus